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Abstract 
We study three pricing mechanisms’ performance and their effects on the participants 
in the data industry from the data supply chain perspective. A win-win pricing strategy 
for the players in the data supply chain is proposed. We obtain analytical solutions in 
each pricing mechanism, including the decentralized and centralized pricing, Nash 
Bargaining pricing, and revenue sharing mechanism.  
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1. Introduction and Literature Review  
 
“Big Data” has recently become the focus of academic and corporate investigation 
(Wamba, 2015). In practice, the economic value of big data is reflected in the success 
of many Internet companies, from search engines to social media sites and data 
repositories which routinely sell this information (Gkatzelis, Aperjis & Huberman, 
2015). In academic, a new scientific paradigm is born as data-intensive scientific 
discovery, which involves a large number of fields and sectors, ranging from economic 
and business activities to public administration, from national security to scientific 
researches in many areas (Chen & Zhang, 2014). In the big data era, data have been 
seen as a new asset and been sold in the market. For example, recently there emerges a 
new kind of startups specialized in selling data. These emerging startups claim 
themselves as “data bank” in big data industry, (e.g., Shujutang, 
http://www.datatang.com) and their value proposition is to provide raw data for the 
whole big data industry, allowing other participants make the best use of the data. Data 
pricing mechanism, which involves the profit allocation and incentive issues, is very 
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fundamental in big data industry, yet the research in this area has not been given 
sufficient consideration. 
 
To fill this research gap, we investigate the data pricing mechanism from data supply 
chain perspective. Along the big data value chain from upstream to downstream (Curry, 
2016), there are basically two types of representative firm. One is the upstream data 
provider who provides raw data for the whole data industry. The other one is the 
downstream application provider who provides end-users with data-based application. 
The data provider, application provider, and the end-users consist the data supply chain. 
Therefore, this paper, from the perspective of data supply chain, investigates the pricing 
and coordination issues among participants in the data transaction.  
 
We consider the new features of data product or service (thereafter we use data product 
throughout this paper). Although data product can be seen as a kind of information 
goods (Sarvary and Parker 1997; Raghunathan & Sarkar, 2016), they differ from the 
traditional information goods. First, data provider can collect end-users’ data (referred 
to as feedback data from end-users), which have value for the data provider. For 
example, Internet companies offer free service to attract users and then monetize users’ 
personal data (Li, Li, Miklau & Suciu, 2012). Nowadays, through API (Application 
Programming Interface), it is easy for the data provider to collet end-users’ data. Second, 
the value of data is context-dependent, which means the same data product might have 
different value in different application context or for different end-users. Therefore, we 
consider the uncertainty of data value and feedback data from end-users in this study. 
 
Our contribution to the existing related literature is two-fold. First, we add to the 
existing information goods pricing literature. The information goods pricing has been 
studied extensively. Sarvary & Parker (1997) study how information goods’ marketing 
strategies should be different with traditional products. Sundararajan (2004) analyzes 
optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information. Chen & Seshadri 
(2007) consider both information goods development and pricing issues. Different from 
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this stream of pricing papers that are analyses from the seller-side, our research analyzes 
the pricing issue from the perspective of supply chain and addresses the interaction 
between upstream data provider and downstream application provider. More related to 
our paper is the recent research in private data pricing in the context of big data. 
Considering the individual’s privacy concern, Li, Li, Miklau & Suciu (2012) propose a 
theoretical framework for assigning prices to queries in order to compensate the data 
owners for their loss of privacy. Gkatzelis, Aperjis & Huberman (2015) investigate the 
private data pricing under sellers’ heterogeneous risk averse attitude and privacy 
concern. While these papers focus on the individual’s private data pricing, our paper 
investigates the data used as a commercial product. Second, our closed-loop data supply 
chain differs from the traditional product closed-loop supply chain, which is mainly 
about reverse logistic (e.g., Dowlatshahi 2000; Wen et al. 2018). However, in our 
closed-loop data supply chain, the logistics issue does not exist and the main concern 
is business value of data. There is extensive literature on product closed-loop supply 
chain. We refer to Govindan Soleimani & Kannan (2015), which gives a comprehensive 
review. 
 
2. Model Setup and Assumptions  
 
We establish our data supply chain based on the reality of big data industry, and the 
data supply chain reflects the core value chain in the big data value chain in Curry 
(2016). The data supply chain consists an upstream data provider, a downstream 
application provider, and end-users, as Figure 1 shows.  
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Closed-Loop Data Supply Chain Model 
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This data supply chain is a representative one in big data industry. Specifically, the data 
provider represents the upstream firm in the data value chain, which provides raw data 
for other firms that can make the best use of the data. The application provider 
represents the downstream firm in the data value chain, which serves the end-user in 
various industries, such as marketing, finance, retailer, and so on. Unlike the traditional 
supply chain, the data supply chain is close-looped and the data provider in the chain, 
through API, can collect data from the end-users. For example, a provider of navigation 
application uses data provider's database of digital map in its application and as a result, 
as the end-users use the navigation, the data provider gets the end-users' data in regard 
to their traveling behavior.  
 
The data provider: the data provider offers the data (e.g., database access) of potential 
value 𝑣𝑣, and charge the unit usage price 𝑤𝑤. Since each end-user has some value for 
the data provider (according to Li, Li, Miklau & Suciu (2012), a recent study by 
JPMorgan Chase found that each unique user is worth approximately $4 to Facebook 
and $ 24 to Google), thus we assume 𝑑𝑑 as the value of each end-user for data provider. 
The data provider needs the downstream application provider to distribute the data, but 
cannot observe the realized value of application. In order to build a concise and tractable 
model, similar to Bhaskaran & Krishnan (2009), we model the value uncertainty as ?̃?𝑟𝑣𝑣, 
where ?̃?𝑟 is uniformly distributed between 𝑟𝑟 and 1 (?̃?𝑟~𝑈𝑈[𝑟𝑟, 1]). As 𝑟𝑟 increases, the 
data value uncertainty decreases. 
 
The application provider: based on the data from the data provider, the application 
provider offers the end-users with application of value ?̃?𝑟𝑣𝑣, and then the expected value 
of the application is 1+𝑟𝑟
2
𝑣𝑣. The application provider charges the end-users unite usage 
price 𝑝𝑝.  
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The end-user: we normalized the size of the end-users to unit one. End-users have 
heterogeneous willingness to pay for the application. Let 𝜃𝜃  denote the users’ unit 
willingness to pay for the application value, and 𝜃𝜃 is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. 
Thus, the expected utility of the type 𝜃𝜃 consumer is 𝑈𝑈 = 𝜃𝜃 1+𝑟𝑟
2
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝. The end-users 
use the application only if their expected utilities are non-negative. Solving for 𝜃𝜃 when 
𝑈𝑈 = 0, we can get the indifferent end-user 𝜃𝜃∗ = 2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣, and therefore the size of the 
end-user base (demand) is 𝐷𝐷 = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 .  
 
We also make the following assumptions:  
Assumption 1. Following the research in information goods, the information goods’ 
variable cost is neglected and fixed cost is sunk. (see Sarvary & Parker, 1997; 
Sundararajan, 2004; Zhang, Nan, Li & Tan, 2016). 
Assumption 2. Data provider and application provider have equal bargaining power, 
and they are risk-neutral. 
Assumption 3. The distribution of the value is common knowledge for both data 
provider and application provider. 
 
3. The Data Pricing Mechanisms  
 
Following the standard analysis in supply chain literature, we begin with the 
decentralized and centralized pricing mechanism. Since the interactive pricing 
mechanisms, whereby the price is not solely determined by the seller but rather 
developed through the interaction between sellers and buyers, is widely used (Kannan 
& Kopalle 2001), we then examine the bargaining pricing mechanisms. Bargaining is 
commonly used in supply chain or channel context (Wu, Baron & Berman, 2009; Du, 
Nie, Chu & Yu, 2014; Iyer & Villas-Boas, 2003). Finally, we compare the 
performances of these pricing mechanisms.  
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3.1 Decentralized and Centralized Pricing Model 
 
In the decentralized data supply chain, the data provider directly charges the application 
provider unite usage price w, and the application provider charges the end-users a price 
of 𝑝𝑝 for the usage of its application. We model the interaction between the two players 
as a two-stage game, with the data provider selecting the wholesale price w in the first 
stage, and the application provider choosing the selling price p in the second stage. 
We characterize the equilibrium of the game by solving the application provider's 
problem first. For a given w, the application provider's optimization problem is given 
by: 
                    max
𝑝𝑝
𝜋𝜋2
𝐷𝐷 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                         (1) 
The profit function is concave in 𝑝𝑝 (𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋2
𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2
= − 4(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0), and therefore the first-order 
condition is sufficient to characterize the optimal best response function 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 1
4
(𝑣𝑣 +
𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 + 2𝑤𝑤).  
In the first stage, the data provider solves the following problem while taking into 
account the application provider's reaction: 
                    max
𝑤𝑤
𝜋𝜋1
𝐷𝐷 = (𝑤𝑤 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                        (2) 
By solving for first-order condition, we get 𝑤𝑤 = 1
4
(𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑), and the second-
order condition is satisfied 𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋1
𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= − 2(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0, and thus 𝑤𝑤 = 14 (𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑) is 
unique maximum point. 
Lemma 1. Under the condition 𝑣𝑣 > 2𝑑𝑑
3(1+𝑟𝑟), the equilibrium prices are 𝑤𝑤 = 14 (𝑣𝑣 +
𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑)  and 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 1
8
(3(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑) ; the expected profits of data provider, 
application provider, and data supply chain are 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 = (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)216(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 , 𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷 =(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
32(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 , 𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷 = 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 + 𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷 = 3(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)232(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 , and the consumer surplus is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 =(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
64(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 . 
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Proof. Substituting the data provider’s price decisions 𝑤𝑤 = 1
4
(𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑)  to 
application provider’s price decision , we get 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 1
8
(3(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑). Thus, by 
substituting these price decisions back into the profit functions, we can get the expected 
profits for data provider and application provider. The consumer surplus is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 =
∫ (θ 1+𝑟𝑟
2
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃1
𝜃𝜃∗
= (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
64(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 . The demand constraint 0 < (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 ≤ 1 requires 
𝑣𝑣 > 2𝑑𝑑
3(1+𝑟𝑟).                                                   ∎ 
According to Lemma 1, we can get the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. When the value of feedback data from end-users is relatively significant 
(1+𝑟𝑟
2
𝑣𝑣 < 𝑑𝑑 < 3(1+𝑟𝑟)
2
𝑣𝑣), all profits (𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 ,𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷 ,𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷) are negatively related to 𝑟𝑟. No matter 
what data value uncertainty (𝑟𝑟), all profits (𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷,𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷 ,𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷) increase with the value of end-
users’ feedback data (𝑑𝑑).   
Proof. 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
= (1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2−4𝑑𝑑2
16(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣  ; 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟 = (1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2−4𝑑𝑑232(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣 ; 𝜕𝜕𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟 = 3((1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2−4𝑑𝑑2)32(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣 . When 𝑑𝑑 >
1+𝑟𝑟
2
𝑣𝑣 , 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋2
𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
, and 𝜕𝜕𝛱𝛱
𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
 are negative.  𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑
= 2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
4(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 > 0 ; 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 = 2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣8(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 > 0; 
𝜕𝜕𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑
= 3(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)
8(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 > 0.                                                 ∎ 
According to proposition 1, it is counterintuitive that all players' profits are negatively 
related with 𝑟𝑟 with the fact that the demand is positively related with 𝑟𝑟. The reason is 
that as 𝑑𝑑  increases, the negative impact of double marginalization (which can be 
shown as 𝛱𝛱∗ − 𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷 = (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
32(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣  ) on the profits increases. As a result, when 𝑑𝑑 is 
sufficiently high the profits will actually decrease as 𝑟𝑟 increases. 
As in the case of decentralized channel, we can get the equilibrium price and profit as 
shown in the Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. In the centralized data supply chain, the equilibrium price is  𝑝𝑝∗ = 1
4
(𝑣𝑣 +
𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 − 2𝑑𝑑), the channel profit is 𝛱𝛱∗ = (𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣+2𝑑𝑑)2
8(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 ; and the consumer surplus is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶∗ =(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
16(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 . 
Since the proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, we skip it.  
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3.2 Nash Bargaining Pricing Model 
 
Instead of directly charging the application provider data usage fee (𝑤𝑤 ), the data 
provider can share 𝛼𝛼 fraction of the application price without charging any upfront fee; 
this pricing mechanism is widely adopted in information goods (e.g., App) and platform 
business model (Chen, Fan & Li, 2016). As it is the case with Iyer and Villas-Boas 
(2003), the channel members make the price decisions through bargaining. In order to 
obtain analytical solutions, we adopt Nash Bargaining solution (Nash 1950, Binmore, 
Rubinstein & Wolinsky, 1986, Ghosh & Shah, 2015) and we call this pricing 
mechanism Nash Bargaining pricing (denoted by superscript 𝐵𝐵). Under this pricing 
mechanism, the expected profit functions of the data provider, the application provider, 
and the data supply chain are as follows: 
                     𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵 = (𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                          (3) 
                     𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝 (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                          (4) 
                     𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵 = 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵 + 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                 (5) 
We investigate two bargaining models. In the first one (denoted by superscript 𝐵𝐵1), 
we consider a case in which the upstream data provider and downstream application 
provider bargain on the sharing ratio 𝛼𝛼 , and then, given the sharing ratio, the 
application provider decides the application price. In the second model (denoted by 
superscript 𝐵𝐵2), the data provider and application provider bargain on both sharing 
ratio 𝛼𝛼 and application price 𝑝𝑝.  
 
3.2.1 Bargaining on Sharing Ratio 
 
In this bargaining model, we use the backward induction to solve the two-stage game. 
In the second stage, the application provider，given the sharing ratio 𝛼𝛼 , decides 
application price to maximize its profit.  
                   max
𝑝𝑝
𝜋𝜋2
𝐵𝐵1 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝 (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                     (6) 
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                       s.t. 0 < (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 ≤ 1. 
The application provider’s optimal pricing is 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵1 = 1
4
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣, which satisfies the 
demand constraint ((1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 = 12). 
In the first stage, the data provider and the application provider decide the sharing ratio 
by adopting Nash Bargaining model, which is given in the following objective function: 
           max
𝛼𝛼
 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵1 = (𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝 (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣            (7) 
                        s.t. 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1 
Solving for the first-order condition, we get 𝛼𝛼 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−4𝑑𝑑
2(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 . It can be shown that the 
second-order condition is satisfied (𝜕𝜕
2 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵1
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼2
= − (1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2
32
< 0). When 𝑣𝑣 > 4𝑑𝑑
1+𝑟𝑟
, 0 <
α < 1. As a result, we can obtain the following lemma.  
Lemma 3. Under the condition 𝑣𝑣 > 4𝑑𝑑
1+𝑟𝑟
, when bargaining on sharing ratio only, the 
optimal price and sharing ration are 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵1 = 1
4
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣, 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−4𝑑𝑑
2(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 ; the expected 
profits of data provider, application provider and data supply chain are 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1 =
1
16
(4𝑑𝑑 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣) , 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵1 = 116 (4𝑑𝑑 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣), 𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵1 = 18 (4𝑑𝑑 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣); the consumer 
surplus is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵1 = 1
16
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣. 
Based on Lemma 3, we get the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. The data provider has no incentive to hide the information of feedback 
data value in the bargaining, even though it can get a higher sharing ratio of the total 
profit in so doing.   
Proof. If the data provider hides the information of feedback data value (in that case 
𝑑𝑑 = 0), we can get its sharing ratio 𝛼𝛼 = 1
2
> 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−4𝑑𝑑
2(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 , but the expected profit of 
data provider is 𝜋𝜋1 = 116 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1 = 116 (4𝑑𝑑 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣).                 ∎ 
 
3.2.2 Bargaining on both sharing ratio and price 
 
The data provider and application provider bargaining on both sharing ratio 𝛼𝛼 and 
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price 𝑝𝑝 is described by the following maximization problem. 
             max
𝑝𝑝,𝛼𝛼 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵2𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵2 = (𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝 (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣           (8) 
                          s.t.  0 < α < 1 
                           0 < (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 ≤ 1  
Solving this optimization problem, we get the following lemma.  
Lemma 4. Under the condition 𝑣𝑣 > 6𝑑𝑑
1+𝑟𝑟
, the unique equilibrium is 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2 = 6𝑑𝑑−𝑣𝑣−𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
4𝑑𝑑−2𝑣𝑣−2𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
,
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑
4
; the expected profits of data provider, application provider and data 
supply chain are 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵2 = (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)216(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 , 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵2 = (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)216(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 , 𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵2 = (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)28(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 ; the 
consumer surplus is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵2 = (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
16(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 . 
Proof.  By solving for first-order condition, we get three stationary points (𝛼𝛼 =
6𝑑𝑑−𝑣𝑣−𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
4𝑑𝑑−2𝑣𝑣−2𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
, 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑
4
), (𝛼𝛼 = 1,𝑝𝑝 = −𝑑𝑑) and (𝛼𝛼 = 1,𝑝𝑝 = 0). Obviously, the second 
and third points are not maximum points. Then we prove (𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2 = 6𝑑𝑑−𝑣𝑣−𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
4𝑑𝑑−2𝑣𝑣−2𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
, 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2 =
𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑
4
) is the maximum point. With 𝑣𝑣 > 6𝑑𝑑
1+𝑟𝑟
, 𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋1
𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋2
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼2
�(𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2,𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2) =
−
(𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑)2(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
32(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2 < 0;  
𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋1
𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋2
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2
�(𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2,𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2) =  − (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2�12𝑑𝑑2−4𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣+(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2�4(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2(𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑)2 < 0 ; 𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 �(𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2,𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2) =
𝑑𝑑(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
4(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2 > 0 . Then we get 𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼2 ∙ 𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2 − (𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 )2�(𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2,𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2) =(𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑)2(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)4
128(1+𝑟𝑟)4𝑣𝑣4 > 0 . Therefore, ( 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2 = 6𝑑𝑑−𝑣𝑣−𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣4𝑑𝑑−2𝑣𝑣−2𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 , 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑4 ) is the 
maximum point of 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵2𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵2 . And 𝑣𝑣 > 6𝑑𝑑1+𝑟𝑟  ensures 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2 < 1  and 0 <(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 1. Substituting 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2 = 6𝑑𝑑−𝑣𝑣−𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣4𝑑𝑑−2𝑣𝑣−2𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣, 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣−2𝑑𝑑4  we get the expected 
profits and consumer surplus.              ∎ 
 
Based on Lemma 4, we compare the two bargaining structures and get the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 3 (a) Bargaining on both sharing ratio and price dominates the bargaining 
only on sharing ratio, and it can achieve the supply chain’s optimal performance; (b) 
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the upstream data provider and downstream application provider share the supply 
chain profit at fixed ratio 1
2
. 
Proposition 3 shows that bargaining only on sharing ratio can distort the price decision, 
leaving the supply chain performance suboptimal. However, if the marginal profit is 
equal for upstream and downstream (𝑑𝑑 = 0  in our setting), the two bargaining 
structures have the same performance (𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1 = 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵1 = 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵2 = 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑣(1+𝑟𝑟)16 ), indicating 
that the feedback data from end-users makes the two bargaining structures different. 
 
3.3 Comparison of the Pricing Mechanisms 
 
In this section, we compare the decentralized pricing with Nash Bargaining pricing 
from the perspectives of data provider, application provider, and end-users respectively.  
Proposition 4. Data supply chain members’ preferences for pricing mechanisms are as 
follows:    
a) For data provider, decentralized pricing is equivalent to bargaining on both 
sharing ratio and price, and they both dominate bargaining only on sharing ratio. 
b) For application provider, end-users, and data supply chain as a whole, bargaining 
on both sharing ratio and price dominates bargaining only on sharing ratio, which 
dominates decentralized pricing. 
Proof. For data provider, 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 − 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑑𝑑24𝑣𝑣+4𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 > 0, 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 − 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵2 = 0, and 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵1 − 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵2 =
−
𝑑𝑑2
4𝑣𝑣+4𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣
< 0 . For application provider, 𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷 − 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵1 = −4𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣+(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2−4𝑑𝑑232(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0 , 
𝜋𝜋2
𝐷𝐷 − 𝜋𝜋2
𝐵𝐵2 = − (2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
32(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0 , and  𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵1 − 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵2 = − 𝑑𝑑24𝑣𝑣+4𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 < 0 . For end-users, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵1 = 4𝑑𝑑2+4𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−3(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2
64(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0  when 𝑣𝑣 > 2𝑑𝑑1+𝑟𝑟 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵2 =
−
3(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
64(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵1 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵2 = −𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)4(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0. For the data supply chain as 
a whole, 𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷 − 𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵1 = −4𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣+(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑣𝑣2−12𝑑𝑑2
32(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0  when 𝑣𝑣 > 2𝑑𝑑1+𝑟𝑟 , 𝛱𝛱𝐷𝐷 − 𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵2 =
−
(2𝑑𝑑+𝑣𝑣+𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣)2
32(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 < 0, and 𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐵𝐵2 = − 𝑑𝑑22𝑣𝑣+2𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 < 0.                          ∎ 
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Proposition 4 shows the conflict of the preferences for pricing mechanisms between 
players in the data supply chain. Specifically, since data provider is the price leader in 
the decentralized pricing, it prefers decentralized pricing. This is anecdotally supported 
by the fact that the data providers usually poste data price on the website 
(http://www.datatang.com). However, other players in the data supply chain are worse 
off under decentralized pricing. Furthermore, although bargaining on both sharing ratio 
and price can achieve the optimal performance in the data supply chain, it allocates the 
maximum profit equally between upstream and downstream players. As a result, it lacks 
the flexibility of profit allocation. In the next section, we will address how to coordinate 
data pricing perfectly. 
 
4. Coordinating Pricing with Revenue Sharing 
 
Revenue sharing contract (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005) differs from the Nash Bargaining 
pricing in that it needs the application provider to pay the upfront data usage fee 𝑤𝑤′. 
Under revenue sharing contract (denoted by superscript 𝑅𝑅 ), the expected profit 
functions of data provider, application provider, and data supply chain are as follows.  
                   𝜋𝜋1𝑅𝑅 = (𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝 + 𝑤𝑤′ + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                        (9) 
                   𝜋𝜋2𝑅𝑅 = ((1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤′) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                      (10) 
                   Π𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋1𝑅𝑅 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑅𝑅 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣                   (11) 
Proposition 5. When the revenue sharing contract parameter satisfies 𝑤𝑤′ =(𝜌𝜌 − 1)𝑑𝑑  (0 < 𝜌𝜌 < 1), the data supply chain are perfectly coordinated, that is, the 
data provider and application provider can share the maximum supply chain profit at 
any ratio. 
Proof. Substituting 𝑤𝑤′ = (𝜌𝜌 − 1)𝑑𝑑 to the profit functions, we can directly get 𝜋𝜋1𝑅𝑅 =
𝜌𝜌(𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌 𝛱𝛱𝑅𝑅 , and 𝜋𝜋2𝑅𝑅 = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣−2𝑝𝑝(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑣𝑣 = (1 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝛱𝛱𝑅𝑅 . 
The profit functions of data provider and application provider are affine transformations 
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of the data supply chain’s profit function. Therefore, individual player’s optimal pricing 
also maximizes the expected profit of the data supply chain.              ∎ 
 
Proposition 5 suggests that, different from the traditional revenue sharing contract, the 
wholesale price 𝑤𝑤′ = (𝜌𝜌 − 1)𝑑𝑑 is negative because 0 < 𝜌𝜌 < 1. As a result, the data 
provider needs to subsidize the application provider. The reason is that the data provider 
can get the feedback data from end-users. Thus, The revenue sharing mechanism 
provides a win-win pricing strategy for all the player in the data supply chain.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the emerging big data industry, data product is different from both traditional product 
and information goods. By focusing on new features of data products, this paper 
investigates data pricing mechanism from the data supply chain perspective. This paper 
studies three pricing mechanisms’ performance and their effects on the participants in 
the data industry. Using game theoretical model, we obtain analytical solutions in each 
pricing mechanism which includes the decentralized and centralized pricing, Nash 
Bargaining pricing, and revenue sharing mechanism. First, we find that decentralized 
pricing has the lowest performance. Second, although Nash Bargaining pricing can 
achieve the centralized channel performance, the upstream data provider and 
downstream application provider can only equally divide the total channel profit. Third, 
revenue sharing, in which the data provider subsidizes the application provider, can 
achieve the first best performance and divide the maximum profit arbitrarily. 
Accordingly, end-users benefit mostly from the bargaining pricing and revenue sharing. 
The findings provide further understanding of the pricing mechanism in data 
transaction and offer some guidelines for the mechanism design of data pricing in the 
big data industry.  
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There are some limitations in this research. First, we only consider a Nash Bargaining 
solution in a symmetric setting for tractability issue. Future research can extend the 
bargaining to an asymmetric setting. Second, in order to focus on the pricing 
mechanism and to capture the profit allocation problem in this mechanism, we only 
consider the price decision in the data supply chain and simplify the dynamic process 
of the data usage. Further research can consider a process of complex data usage. 
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